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Determining Yuan Valuation- An Extension of the IMF External Balance
Assessment Approach
Abstract
This paper applies the IMF EBA methodology to a China-specific time series analysis, using a 2SLS
instrumented regression with Newey-West standard errors to determine the policy gap that results from
PBOC intervention. We find the impact of reserve accumulation to be more significant in magnitude than
indicated by the EBA, demonstrating a modest improvement in accuracy with the introduction of central
bank liquidity swaps as a novel instrument. Evidence of a long term equilibrium relationship is also found
between the real effective exchange rate and reserve accumulation, with the presence of medium level
capital controls.
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Motivation
The past year’s debate on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Trade
Promotion Authority (TPA) has led to discussion on what is referred to as
currency manipulation, the act of devaluing currency in order to increase exports
and reduce imports.
Trade rules have obliged countries to refrain from such practices, but
enforcement of such obligations depends on certification by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) “that a country’s exchange rate policies were contravening
IMF obligations as well as distorting trade flows” (Bergsten and Schott 2015).
The Hatch-Wyden amendment to TPP attempted to address the issue of
currency manipulation through existing membership obligations in the IMF, with
Senator Hatch (R-UT), chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, directly
referencing the results of the External Balance Assessment (EBA) in May, 2015
speech on the senate floor. The amendment failed, but it highlights the
significance policymakers attach to the conclusions of the IMF methodology.
Recent events have drawn attention to China in particular. The People’s
Republic has experienced $158.7 billion in capital outflows in December of 2015
alone, with the 2015 total outflows estimated to be at $1 trillion (Bloomberg
2016). In response, new capital controls were introduced in September of 2015.
The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) has had to intervene to support the Yuan. As
a result, China’s foreign exchange (FX) reserves hit a three year low in January of
2016 (Wei 2016), with December 2015 marking the largest single monthly drop
($107.9 billion) since 2003 (Yap 2016).
The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of PBOC intervention
on China’s real effective exchange rate (REER). This paper builds upon the
IMF’s EBA methodology, with the goal of demonstrating value in countryspecific analysis in contrast to the EBA cross-country panel approach.
Forex intervention is when a central bank enters the foreign exchange
market to buy or sell currency, typically through FX reserves, to influence
exchange rates.
As to the why, various motives are cited in literature. Mohanty and Berger
of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) survey 19 central banks to rank
motives for intervention and find the primarily motivation for intervention is to
curb excessive exchange rate speculation (Mohanty and Berger 2013, 58).
Attempts to control inflation, discourage sudden capital inflows or outflows,
ensure financial stability, and build or reduce FX reserves are all found to be
motivators for intervention as reported by central banks.
The paper is divided into three sections. Beginning with a literature review
that outlines the measures used to proxy for intervention, the recent history of the
Yuan and China’s exchange rate regime, as well as an explanation of the purpose
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capital controls serve for sterilized intervention. This is followed by a data and
methodology section, explaining the EBA and characteristics that make this paper
distinct from the IMF approach. The final results section covers the instruments
used in this study, the impact of intervention, consistency with the EBA results, as
well as contributions to literature.
I.

Literature Review

Measures of intervention & Lack of Transparency
Proxies are used to measure intervention because there is a lack of public
intervention data, as only some central banks disclose such data, while others do
not. This has acted as a major hindrance on the further study of intervention
(Edison 1993).
The PBOC does not disclose intervention and currency composition of FX
reserves. It is not uncommon for central banks to keep intervention confidential.
One possible reason is Taylor’s (1982a and 1982b) explanation, dating back to the
fixed exchange rate Bretton-Woods era, where any reports of intervention could
result in a panic and run on a currency. However, given the lack of transparency
which has persisted since the end of Bretton-Woods, literature (Neely 2000, 21)
argues central banks may wish to avoid accountability.
Neely also brings up the possibility of secret interventions, or attempts to
conceal the size and/or volume of intervention, which can sometimes prove more
effective in influencing exchange rates (Bhattacharya and Weller 1997).
Intervention Proxy
The metric used in this paper is changes in FX reserves from period-to-period, as
used by the EBA. Multiple studies have used change in reserves as a proxy for
intervention before (C. Neely 2000; Obstfeld 1983; Kearney and MacDonald
1986; Gartner 1987, 1991).
However, one concern over the use of changes in FX reserves as a proxy
measure is such reserves can change for a variety of other reasons. This can be
due to currency swap agreements, paying back foreign-denominated debt (Neely
2000), swap lines with private firms, and other factors outlined below.
Other measures can be found in the Treasury Department’s semi-annual
report to congress on exchange rates. The Treasury uses levels of FX reserves to
observe reserve accumulation, which can indicate a devalued currency (Powell
2013, 2), as well as two undisclosed measures that, upon inquiry, remain
confidential.

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol13/iss1/5

2

Banerjee: Determining Yuan Valuation

A third measure used in literature includes news reports, due a lack of
transparent intervention data (Neely 2000; Peiers 1997; Goodhart and Hesse
1993).
Challenges to Change in Reserves Proxy
The value of FX reserves can change as a result of multiple reasons. The FX value
of the currencies held in reserve can shift. One could potentially compensate for
changes in valuation of a currency if one knows the composition of reserves.
However, such composition is not disclosed by the PBOC. The other two reasons
are interest income/coupon payments as well as changes in value of the
underlying asset(s) (Neely 2000, 22) such as Treasuries. There are also other uses
of reserves. For example, changes might encompass any government purchase
from abroad or payment of debt denominated in a foreign currency (Neely 2000,
6).
Intervention can also be carried out without FX reserves, in order to show
no changes in reserves on a central bank’s balance sheets. Existing literature
(Neely 2000, 22) discusses Taylor’s (1982a and 1982b) findings regarding how
France, Italy, Spain, and the UK utilized nationalized industries to conduct
transactions in the 1970s to hide intervention. There is also evidence of Japan and
France intervening using hidden reserves held at commercial banks (Neely 2000,
22). Neely also discusses how a central back can conduct intervention through
forward markets, arguing a central bank can “offset with a spot transaction when
the forward contract is executed.”(Neely 2000, 22).
Neely further discusses how allocation of special drawing rights (SDRs)
from the IMF may alter FX reserves, but this does not prove to be an issue in
China’s case as SDRs are kept as a separate line item on PBOC balance sheets.
The Yuan in review
This brief survey of the Yuan exchange rate begins in 2005, when China broke
from the peg to the dollar in July, (Weisenthal 2015) and by Sept. the U.S.
Treasury accused the IMF of being “asleep at the wheel” for allowing China to
maintain an undervalued currency (“Remarks by Under Secretary… Adams”
2005).
By April 2012 the Yuan trading band went from 0.5 percent to 1 percent
(Weisenthal 2015). The trading band is the rate at which the PBOC allows the
Yuan to rise or fall from a daily midpoint rate set each day (Sweeney and Jianxin
2014). The larger this band is, the greater a role market forces can play in
determining the exchange rate. The set midpoint rate can also be referred to as the
central parity rate.
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In March 2014 the PBOC widened the Yuan trading band from one to two
percent(Sweeney and Jianxin 2014). By June China’s FX reserves peaked at $3.9
trillion, as the PBOC began to sell dollars to support the Yuan (Weisenthal 2015).
The following April in 2015 Deputy Director of the IMF’s Asia Pacific
Department, Markus Rodlauer, said the Yuan was close to a point where it was
“no longer being undervalued”(Weisenthal 2015). By Aug. the PBOC set the
Yuan central parity down 1.9 percent, further closing the gap between central
parity and the spot price. The move was welcomed by the IMF, as it allowed
market forces to play a greater role in determining the exchange rate (Weisenthal
2015).
Later that month on Aug. 11 markets saw the single largest devaluation of
the Yuan in 20 years, followed by a second devaluation the following day.
However, the PBOC attempted to reassure markets it was not looking to embark
on a steady depreciation (Inman and Ryan 2015). In November of 2015 the IMF
approved the addition of the Yuan to its reserve currency (i.e. SDR) basket.
Finally, this February (2016) marked the lowest FX reserve levels since
2012, with half a trillion dollar decline in FX reserves in 2015, the first ever
annual decline seen for China (Bloomberg 2016).
Use of Capital Controls
The use of effective capital controls allows policymakers to influence exchange
rates through sterilized intervention (Engel 2011).
Given a basic scenario, let one say the PBOC sells dollar-denominated
assets from its FX reserves. By increasing the supply of dollars in the dollar forex
market, the PBOC can appreciate the Yuan against the dollar towards a target
exchange rate. However, this sale of dollar-denominated FX decreases China’s
monetary base by definition. To counteract this effect, the PBOC sells bonds to
sterilize the intervention, with capital controls necessarily to minimizing the
impact on the monetary base effectively.
Sterilization by a central bank means “[reversing] the effects of the foreign
exchange transaction on the monetary base,”(Neely 2000, 21). As opposed to
unsterilized intervention, which is the equivalent of carrying out domestic
monetary policy (Neely 2000, 21) through changing of the monetary base. Neely
provides an example; “When a central bank buys (sells) foreign exchange, the
monetary base increases (decreases) by the amount of the purchase (sale).”(Neely
2000, 1). To reverse (i.e. sterilize) the effect on the domestic monetary base, a
central bank can buy (sell) domestic bonds (Neely 2000; Edison 1993).
However, sterilized intervention has no effect on exchange rates if
domestic and foreign bonds are perfect substitutes (i.e. currency denomination of
bond does not matter to investor). If investors are indifferent about holding a
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domestic or foreign bond, then changes in the supply of bonds should not have an
impact on the exchange rate (Dominguez 2008), and central banks attempts to
issue bonds to sterilize intervention would be theoretically ineffective.
Capital controls provide for limited capital mobility, resulting in foreign
and domestic currency denominated assets being imperfect substitutes. As a
result, when a central bank issues bonds with capital controls in place, it can
effectively lower the price of bonds domestically and absorb the extra liquidity to
keep the monetary base unchanged.
Recent Events
The past decade has seen a gradual liberalization of capital controls in China.
However, the capital flight in the third and fourth quarters of 2015 may change
this, as China introduced new controls in September of 2015 (Wei and Trivedi).
These controls are not perfect. December of 2015 alone saw $158.7 billion in
capital outflows, while the year’s outflow stands at $1 trillion (Bloomberg 2016).
Recent events from July 2015 onward are what led us to limit the paper’s time
horizon to 2015 quarter two, given the recent volatility in FX reserve changes,
capital outflows, and the corresponding controls to prevent such outflows.
II.

Data and Methodology

Real Broad Effective Exchange Rate (REER)
The REER index is an average of bilateral real exchange rates between a country
(China) and its trading partners; weighted by respective trade shares of each
partner. It constitutes the amount of foreign exchange needed to buy RMB. For
example, if the REER rises for China the RMB appreciates, as you need more FX
to buy RMB. REER indices are provided by the Bank for International
Settlements.
Policy Variables
Foreign Exchange (FX) Intervention
Intervention is proxied for using quarterly changes in FX reserves as listed from
the PBOC balance sheets. These changes are scaled to real GDP. Change in FX
reserves is interacted with the Quinn capital controls index, where 0 represents no
controls, while 1 represents full controls. These two variables are interacted
because the use of effective capital controls allow policymakers to influence
exchange rates through sterilized intervention (Engel 2011).
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The issue of endogeneity arises with the use change in reserves interacted
with capital controls. The presence of other control variables as well as
instruments are used to correct for this.
M2 (scaled to GDP) is used to account for a crisis prevention motive,
while U.S. short term interest rates are used to capture reserve accumulation
motives (Phillips et al. 2013).
This paper also introduces a new instrument to control for endogeneity
between reserve accumulation and the level of REER, liquidity swap agreements.
This is proxied for through the volume of swaps as reported by the Russian
Central Bank, as Russia and China have had liquidity swap agreements in place
since Oct. 2014 (Ostroukh 2014). This instrument helps account for reserve
changes uncorrelated with intervention and the REER.
Monetary Policy
This paper uses short-term real interest rate differentials to proxy for the impact of
monetary policy on the REER. The interest rate differential is the difference
between Chinese and U.S. short-term real rates. This is interacted with capital
account openness, as the EBA suggests the magnitude to which monetary policy
explains movements in the REER is influenced by the degree of openness to
capital flows (Phillips et al. 2013, 26).
Public Health Expenditure; Lagged
Health expenditure is included to capture the impact on savings rates in a country.
National savings rates can be influenced by rises and drops in public spending on
health care. The variable is scaled to GDP. The data was obtained through the
World Health Organization.
Non-Policy Variables
Demeaned Private Credit
Meant to serve as an indirect measure for financial excesses, the variable is also
intended to capture the failure of policies meant to prevent such excesses. Such
excesses can result in shocks to demand, and real appreciation (Phillips et al.
2013).The purpose of this variable is to indicate the impact financial policies have
(Phillips et al. 2013) on the REER.
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Financial Home Bias
This variable indicates domestic preference for domestic assets (Phillips et al.
2013). It is measured as the share of domestic debt owned by residents of that
country. Data from the Bank of International Settlements.
Productivity Interacted with Capital Account Openness
Measure of output per employed person for China, constructed relative to the U.S.
Constructed as an index, baselined at 2000 quarter one. In theory capital flows
will move from low to high productivity countries (Gourinchas and Jeanne 2013),
to the extent to which countries permit such capital inflows (Phillips et al. 2013);
hence the interaction with capital account openness.
VIX/VXO Interacted with Capital Account Openness; Lagged
Demeaned VIX over VXO is used as an indicator of global risk aversion (Phillips
et al. 2013). The negative coefficient is linked to the need to generate a current
account surplus when global risk aversion increases and access to credit becomes
more constrained (Phillips et al. 2013). The EBA finds the more open the capital
account, the stronger the effect of risk aversion.
Commodity Terms of Trade
The ratio of real exports to imports prices of commodities. The commodity index
is the ratio of a geometric weighted average price of main export categories to
commodity import categories, relative to advanced economies manufactured
goods prices (Phillips et al. 2013, 45). The weights are given by their share in the
countries’ exports to imports. The index is constructed from the prices of six
commodity categories (food, fuels, agricultural raw materials, metals, gold, and
beverages). These relative commodity prices of six categories are weighted by the
time average of export and import shares of each commodity category in total
trade (exports and imports of goods and services) (Phillips et al. 2013, 45). This
data is obtained through the EBA dataset.
Trade Openness
The sum of exports and imports, scaled to GDP, as a proxy measure for trade
liberalization.

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2016

7

Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 13 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 5

IMF EBA Dataset and Gap Analysis
Data for log commodity terms of trade and financial home bias were obtained
through the IMF EBA dataset. The data ends at 2010, with 2013 observations
provided. For these two variables we use an autoregressive analysis to forecast the
gaps until 2015. Residuals from the AR process are used as a regressor to provide
for a more accurate forecasts, if the residuals are found to be statistically
significant.
The EBA constitutes a cross-country panel regression involving 40
countries, with 769 observations from 1990 to 2010 at an annual frequency, while
2013 observations are used in gap analysis. The methodology utilizes a set of
policy and non-policy variables outlined above, as well as additional non-policy
variables (e.g. South African apartheid dummy variable, population growth, and
GDP growth forecast, own currency’s share in world reserves). These additional
non-policy variables were not included in this paper due to data availability
issues, or they were found to be negligible (i.e. apartheid dummy variable,
currency share in world reserves).
The IMF EBA gap analysis can be broken down into the following steps.
̂ + 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙
1. 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅 = 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅
̂ = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝛽 + 𝑃𝛾
2. 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅
̂ = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝛽 + 𝑃∗ 𝛾 + (𝑃 − 𝑃 ∗ )𝛾
3. 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅

Where X is a vector of non-policy variables and P is a vector comprising of
policy variables. P* constitutes desirable policy variables, as determined by the
IMF. Gamma represents the slope parameter for the policy variable of choice.
(P-P*) is considered the policy gap contribution to the deviation from the
REER norm. This paper’s focus is on the impact of intervention, and as a result
focuses on the desirable value assigned to the intervention proxy measure (change
in reserves/GDP * K Controls) for China. The desirable value for change in
reserves in this case is zero. Gamma’s value is the slope parameter for the
intervention proxy.
The desirable value of zero is used for countries which are deemed by the IMF
to have reserves in excess of what the IMF refers to as the “suggested adequacy
range” (“2015 External Sector Report,” n.d., 12), determined using a confidential
metric for assessing reserve adequacy.
The ESR provides a composite metric. Countries with reserves in the range of
100-150 percent of this composite metric are considered to have adequate
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reserves for precautionary purposes (“Assessing Reserve Adequacy - Further
Considerations” 2013). In the IMF 2015 External Sector Report it is found that
“China’s reserves at end-2014 were 149 percent of the unadjusted metric and 238
percent of the metric adjusted for capital flow management measures. Under
either metric, the staff assessment is that further accumulation is unnecessary
from a reserves adequacy perspective.”(“2015 External Sector Report,” n.d., 12).
This study carries out both a levels and log REER instrumented 2SLS
regression with heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (robust NeweyWest) standard errors. The prior is used for gap analysis as discussed above, while
the latter is used to predict a percent change in the REER, given a percent change
in reserves. The 2SLS is carried out twice, using the same instruments as the IMF
(i.e. M2/GDP and U.S. interest rates) as well as a new instrument (i.e. volume of
Russian Central Bank FX swaps). The time horizon encompasses 2000 quarter
one to 2015 quarter two.
III.

Results

Instruments
The underidentification test rejects the null that the equation is underidentified at
the 5% level. The underidentification test is an LM test of whether the equation is
identified (i.e. excluded instruments are relevant and correlated with endogenous
regressor). It is the test of the rank of a matrix, with the rejection of the null
indicating the matrix is full column rank (i.e. model is identified).
In regards to testing for instruments, the first-stage F-test of the crisis
prevention motive (m2/GDP) and Russian swaps is significant at the 1% level
with an F-statistic of 27.27. The crisis prevention motive and U.S. short term rates
results in an F-Statistic of 29.33, and is also significant at the 1% level. Both pairs
of instruments exceed the F>10 threshold, rejecting the weak instruments null
(Staiger et al. 1997; Stock and Yogo 2005).
Concerning instrument validity, the Hansen-J test indicates the
instruments are valid at all levels for both instrument combinations.
Reserve Accumulation
We find an additional 1% increase in reserve accumulation relative to GDP (with
medium level capital controls in place) is predicted to depreciate the REER by
14.9%, ceteris paribus. In contrast, EBA Results indicate a 0.75% depreciation of
the REER for a 1% increase in reserves.
Using the EBA methodology’s gap analysis, we find reserve accumulation
results in a -3.1% contribution to the level of REER, in contrast to the -1.3%
contribution the EBA finds (“2015 EBA: Individual Country Estimates” 2015,
26).
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It is worth noting for the EBA the cross-sectional variation of reserve
accumulation is twice the time variation within countries, which makes it difficult
to determine the impact (Phillips et al.). In this paper’s instance, there is no crosscountry variation to be concerned with. What does make finding forex
intervention’s impact challenging in our paper is determining what observed value
should be used for gap analysis. The paper uses the average level of intervention
from the last two years as the observed intervention value. Single quarters are
volatile, given the heavy intervention by the PBOC over the last year.
Consistency with EBA
This paper finds while the impact of each variable on the REER (the sign of each
coefficient) is consistent with EBA findings, the magnitude of the reserve
accumulation proxy measure is not.
Policy variables such as the real interest rate differential and lagged public
health expenditure, along with non-policy measures such as productivity, are
found to be statistically insignificant. This is unique to the case of China when
contrast to EBA findings.
Concerning the accuracy of fitted values, the EBA root MSE is about 8%,
in contrast to under 7% with our findings.
Mean Reversion
Both financial home bias and the real interest rate differential interacted with
capital account openness are found to be I(0) (integrated to order 0) stationary,
with the augmented Dicky-Fuller test at the 1 percent level, using several different
lag lengths. Non-stationary variables’ relevance is determined by cointegration
testing through the Engle-Granger two-step method.
The non-stationary characteristics seen in some data may be due to a short
time horizon or limited observations. In such cases the standard errors are not
reliable, and statistical inferences are not valid as a result (Engle and Granger
1987)
We find ln REER and change in reserves interacted with capital controls
are cointegrated at the 5% level until two or more lags, demonstrating the
intervention proxy measure’s significance as a non-stationary variable. This
suggests a long-run equilibrium relationship between ln REER and reserve
accumulation (Paul, n.d.). Cointegration also implies there exists an error
correction data generating mechanism as well (Engle and Granger 1987). Our
findings are consistent between both combinations of instruments used.
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In regards to the use of lags, literature suggests with too few lags,
remaining serial correlation in errors will bias the ADF test (E Zivot, n.d.).
However, the power of the test suffers with too many lags (E Zivot, n.d.).
Implications for Literature
We find reserve accumulation in China’s case has far more economically
significant impact on the REER than in the cross-country panel EBA results. The
novel use of Russian currency swaps proved to be a valid and strong instrument.
Swaps have been used before to explain low correlation between reserves changes
and intervention, particularly in the case of Germany (Neely 2000). The
suggestion to use liquidity swaps to account for changes in reserves in regards to
the intervention proxy came from Maurice Obstfeld.
However, the liquidity swaps for another central bank (i.e. Russia) that has
a swap agreement with a country of interest’s central bank (i.e. PBOC) was not
found to be an instrument commonly used in existing literature to deal with the
endogeneity issue presented by the of reserve accumulation measure.
There is existing literature on cointegration between nominal exchange
rates and reserve accumulation (Adam Elhiraika and Léonce Ndikumana 2007).
Specifically in China’s case, evidence of cointegration has been found between
the log difference in the level of forex reserves and log difference of the REER
(Jin 2003). Our finding of cointegration between quarterly changes in FX reserves
as a percentage of GDP and the ln REER for China is unique, and fits into current
literature on the long-run relationship between reserve accumulation and the
REER.
In regards to the EBA, this paper marks a move towards country-specific
analysis. The reason this is of value is due to the fact that the EBA relies on
statistical significance for the intervention proxy primarily from two countries in
the sample. If China is removed from the EBA REER regression, intervention is
no longer significant. If Malaysia is removed, intervention is significant only at
the 10 percent level.
In terms of accuracy, our findings have a slightly lower root MSE than
that of the EBA, indicating country-specific regressions may make a modest
difference in accuracy.
Furthermore, the pooled regression used in the EBA is unbalanced, as
there are different numbers of observations for different nations. For example,
there are 21 observations for the US, but only 19 for India, 14 for Indonesia, and
12 for Pakistan. Country-specific analysis, as in this paper’s case, need not be
concerned over unbalanced panels potentially effecting results.
The EBA panel regression offers 21 observations at most for a nation,
with the 2014 dataset only going as far as 2010. While it utilizes 2013

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2016

11

Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 13 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 5

observations, it does not take into account 2011-2013 in the regression. In
drawing conclusions for 2015 this paper utilizes a dataset that encompasses a time
horizon up to the second quarter of 2015, utilizing observations from the time
horizon it is drawing a conclusion on.
Limitations
One limitation to this paper is the short time horizon used, resulting in nonstationary variables that are not always cointegrated with ln REER (e.g.
Demeaned private credit, log commodity terms of trade, demeaned VIX). The
model’s ability to explain about 75% of the variation seen in the observations
does not hold as much weight when taking into consideration the small number of
observations (i.e. 59) used.
There is also a higher likelihood of omitted variable bias in this work
when contrast to cross-country panel data like that of the EBA. This is due to
panel data’s advantage in controlling for omitted variables.
Future Steps
There remain several steps to take to further this paper. A first-differences
regression would aid in dealing with non-stationary data, and would go hand-inhand with investigating for multicointegration in regards to I(2) systems.
We wish to test for nonlinear relationships as well. For example, some
literature suggests a nonlinear approach to evaluate the relationship between the
real interest rate differential and REER (Nakagawa 2002).
Next, country-specific analysis provides for looking at variables impacted
by the level of capital controls in place. Little to moderate levels of capital
controls has been found to influence financial home bias (Forslund, Lima, and
Panizza 2011), so it would be appropriate to interact with CC as a future step.
Finally, we would like to find the impact of reserve accumulation by
currency composition by Dollar reserves, Euro reserves, et cetera. This is
currently impossible as the PBOC has not disclosed this publicly.
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Appendices
Exhibit 1
Ln(REER) Regression with M2/GDP and U.S. Interest Rates as Instruments

Centered R2 = 0.7447
Lag is 3 quarters
Observations: 59
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Exhibit 2
Fitted values Scattered Against Residuals with M2/GDP and U.S. Interest Rates
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Exhibit 3
Fitted and Observed Values with M2/GDP and U.S. Interest Rates
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Exhibit 4
Ln(REER) Regression with M2/GDP and Russian Swaps as Instruments

Centered R2 = 0.7557
Lag is 3 quarters
Observations: 59
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Exhibit 5
Fitted values Scattered Against Residuals with M2/GDP and Russian Swaps
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Exhibit 6
Fitted and Observed Values with M2/GDP and Russian Swaps
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Exhibit 7
Log REER Actual and Fitted Values from EBA
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